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1 Duke University School of Law professor 
James Boyle wrote, “If one had to represent the im-
age of creativity around which copyright law and 
patent law, respectively, are built, patent law’s model 
of creativity would be a pyramid and copyright law’s 
a fountain, or even an explosion.”2 This Article asks 
“Why?” and “Can copyright law, specifically in the area 
of licensing digital music samples, learn anything from 
patent law?” This Article will explore: how the Biotech 
community has learned to share patented materials 
easily and equitably through the Uniform Biological 
Material Transfer Agreement (UBMTA);3 how develop-
ment of the doctrine of Experimental Use allows for 
beneficial unlicensed use of patented materials;4 how 
the traditional copyright licensing structure does not 
work for digital music samples;5 how Fair Use does not, 
at least at the moment, lend itself to obviate the need 
for a restructuring of the copyright licensing system;6 
why copyright needs the benefit of liberal borrowing 
techniques like those patent licensing enjoys from the 
UBMTA;7 and how copyright law can, and already has, 
started to model itself off of variations on patent licens-
ing model agreements.8 Creativity, in the realm of both 
patents and copyrights, may not be that different.
 The UBMTA is the right model for this 
specific type of copyright reform because the 
underlying sentiments of scientific research and music 
made with digital samples are the same. A large part of 
research is conducted for non-commercial purposes, for 
the joy of exploration. Similarly, a majority of music is 
created without concern for commercial gain, solely for 
the sake of sonic exploration. The UBMTA encourages 
1. Adam G. Holofcener: University of Maryland School of 
Law, J.D. (2012). Thanks to those in the intellectual property 
department at Maryland Law, Future of Music Coalition, and 
Maryland Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts for making the law fun. I 
also have to thank my family, friends, and Baltimore.  
Adam.Holofcener.Law@gmail.com - http://www.kunstemporary.
com.  
2.  James Boyle, The Public Domain 123-24 (2008).
3.  See Part I(A), infra. 
4.  See Part I(B), infra.
5.  See Part II(A), infra.
6.  See Part II(B), infra.
7.  See Part III(A), infra.
8.  See Part III(B), infra.
creation engendered by humanity’s insatiable curiosity. 
And the UBMTA does not stop there. The commercial 
possibilities surrounding both scientific research and 
music production are too lucrative to be ignored. The 
UBMTA creates pathways for scientists and institutions 
conducting non-commercial uses to go commercial 
with little friction and compensation for all parties 
involved. A similar structure would benefit everyone 
participating in music production, from the bedroom 
composer to the major record label. Humans should be 
allowed to mess around with the world around them, 
in both the contexts of organic material and media. The 
UBMTA properly lays out the parameters for sharing 
all intellectual property in both non-commercial and 
commercial transactions.   
I. Transferring Patented Materials Between 
Members of the Biotech Community for 
Non-Commercial and Commercial Use 
 Through the UBMTA, the members of 
the Biotech community have a method of using 
each others’ patented material for non-commercial 
means without much cost, and sometimes none at 
all. These non-commercial uses can then be turned 
into commercial uses. This section of the paper will 
first examine the UBMTA as a successful vehicle for 
freely, or cheaply, licensing patented materials for non-
commercial research purposes while allowing for the 
fruits of the research to be used for later commercial 
purposes. Second, this section will analyze the 
development of the doctrine of Experimental Use.
A. The UBMTA
 Generally, a Material Transfer Agreement 
(MTA) is “a . . . contract between the owner of a . . 
. material and a party [seeking] the material . . . for 
research purposes.”9  As the National Institute of 
Health (NIH) points out: 
MTAs are important because they require the recipient 
to exercise care in the handling of the materials, to 
maintain control over the distribution of the materials, 
9.  Nat’l Inst. of Health , RepoRt of the NatioNal iNstitute 
of health (Nih) WoRkiNg gRoup oN ReseaRch tools, app. B 
(1998) [hereinafter Research Tools Report], available at http://
biotech.law.lsu.edu/research/fed/NIH/researchtools/Report98.htm. 
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to acknowledge the provider in publications, and to 
follow relevant [Public Health Service] guidelines 
relating to recombinant DNA, protection of human 
subjects in research, and the use of animals.10 
 However, MTAs are not all consistent; a 
model MTA, such as the UBMTA, is helpful for 
transferring patented materials while making sure that 
the principles above are applied uniformly.11 Exploring 
the history of the UBMTA will help us to understand 
the niceties of the actual agreement and its reasons for 
possible success.
1. History of the UBMTA
 In 1988, the Public Health Service (PHS) 
issued their “Policy Relating to Distribution of Unique 
Research Resources Produced with [Public Health 
Service] Funding,” acknowledging problems that befell 
PHS and NIH scientists with MTAs that required case-
by-case negotiations.12 In 1989, the NIH, in response 
to the PHS’s “Policy,” released a model MTA to be used 
by PHS scientists; however, this model MTA did not 
extend to other organizations.13 The UBMTA grew out 
of this tradition.14 The NIH proposed the UBMTA 
in 1994, in conjunction with members of academia15 
and industry, “to address concerns about contractual 
obligations imposed by some [material transfer 
agreements] and to simplify the process of sharing 
proprietary materials between non-profit institutions.”16 
Specifically, the UBMTA cut down on transaction 
costs associated with the transfer of biological materials 
and streamlined the process so that a transfer could 
take place with only an implementing letter and 
a statement, signed by the Provider and Recipient 
scientists, acknowledging that the agreement was in 
10.  Uniform Biological Material Transfer Agreement: 
Discussion of Public Comments Received; Publication of the Final 
Format of the Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg. 12,771, 12,771 (Mar. 8, 
1995) [hereinafter UBMTA].
11.  Michael A. Carrier, Innovation for the 21st 
Century: Harnessing the Power of Intellectual Property 
and Antitrust Law 286 (2009).
12.  U.S. Dep’t. of Health and Human Serv. NIH Guide 
For Grants and Contracts, Vol. 17, No. 29, September 16, 
1988: pg. 1.
13.  UBMTA: Request for Comments, 59 Fed. Reg. 32,000 
(Jun. 21, 1994).
14.  Id.
15.  Members of the Association of University Technology 
Managers (“AUTM”), Ms. Joyce Brinton, Harvard University; Ms. 
Lita Nelsen, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and Dr. Sandra 
Shotwell, Oregon Health Sciences University.
16.  UBMTA: Request for Comments, 59 Fed. Reg. 32,000 
(Jun. 21, 1994).
accordance with the UBMTA.17 In 1995, the NIH 
issued a final version of the UBMTA after reviewing 
public comments on the 1994 proposal.18
 The public comments addressed two areas of 
the UBMTA that the NIH ended up revising from 
the original version.19 First, the provision mandating 
that the Provider of the material furnish the Recipient 
with information regarding the patent status of the 
materials was removed for fear that the Recipient may 
inadvertently harm the Provider’s chance of successfully 
obtaining a patent for the material.20 Second, the NIH 
added a provision that obliged institutions to provide a 
legally binding signatory to UBMTA material transfers 
if the scientist signing the agreement is not legally 
authorized to bind the institution.21
 The PHS recommended that the UBMTA be 
adopted “for general use in the exchange of materials 
for research purposes among public and non-profit 
organizations,” but for-profit organizations were not 
precluded from using the document.22 The PHS 
acknowledged that the UBMTA may not be sufficient 
for every material transfer, however, it was believed that 
the desired benefits of this model agreement would 
come to fruition even if the UBMTA was only used in 
the majority of transfers.23 Those institutions who have 
signed onto the UBMTA, a list of now over 400, can 
be found on the Association of University Technology 
Managers website.24 In 2008, the NIH released 
a Research Tools Report which reemphasized the 
importance of the UBMTA and some constraints the 
document itself may have, in both its current format 
and usage.25 
2. Provisions of the UBMTA
 For the purposes of this paper, the UBMTA 
contains two parts: the implementing letter and the 
17.  Id.
18.  UBMTA, 60 Fed. Reg. at 12,771.
19.  Id. (making other small changes to the original proposal 
such as refining the definitions of “modification” and “non-profit 
organization,” and adding a definition for “commercial Purposes”).
20.  Id.
21.  Id.
22.  Id.
23.  Id.
24.  Association of University Technology Managers, 
Signatories to the March 8, 1995 Master UBMTA Agreement, http://
www.autm.net/Technology_Transfer_Resources/7150.htm.
25.  Research Tools Report, supra note 9, at 
“Recommendations.” For the purposes of this paper, the UBMTA’s 
inadequate implementation will not be relevant because the focus 
here is on theoretical differences between patent and copyright 
licensing, not the problems of implementation which surround any 
policy once it is put into use.
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actual agreement.26 A material transfer can take place 
when an implementing letter is signed by both the 
Provider27 and Recipient28 scientists, and, if need 
be, by someone at the Recipient institution with 
legally binding authority, if the scientist attached 
to the agreement does not have such authority.29 
The implementing letter includes information on 
the Provider and Recipient institutions, the original 
material being transferred, being transferred, a 
possible termination date and a transmittal fee, if the 
Provider incurred any preparation or distribution costs 
in the material transfer.30 The implementing letter 
acknowledges that both parties to the agreement have 
signed an unmodified copy of the UBMTA and agree 
to be bound by its terms.31 Michael Carrier, in his book 
Innovation for the 21st Century: Harnessing the Power 
of Intellectual Property and Antitrust Law, lists the 
eight fundamental provisions to the UBMTA; we will 
explore each provision in turn.32
 First, the UBMTA stipulates that the Provider 
owns the Material.33 This clause also states that the 
Provider retains ownership of any Material contained or 
incorporated in Modifications.34 Second, the Recipient 
retains ownership of (1) Modifications, except for the 
Material still included in said Modifications, and (2) 
substances created through the use of the Material 
or Modifications, but which are NOT Progeny, 
Unmodified Derivatives, or Modifications.35 These 
first two provisions are important because they set up 
26.  UBMTA, 60 Fed. Reg. at 12,771. In the UBMTA 
framework there is also a “simple letter agreement for transfer of 
non-proprietary biological material,” however, our analysis can 
take place without dissecting this document, which shares essential 
qualities with the rest of the UBMTA materials.
27.  Id. at 11,773. The UBMTA defines a “Provider” as an 
organization providing the Original Material.
28.  Id. The UBMTA defines a “Recipient” as an organization 
receiving the Original Material.
29.  Id. at 12,771.
30.  UBMTA at 12,773, 12,775. The UBMTA defines 
“Original Material” as the material described for transfer in the 
implementing letter.
31.  UBMTA, 60 Fed. Reg. at 12,772.
32.  Carrier, supra note 11, at 286.
33.  UBMTA, 60 Fed Reg. at 12,773 (defining “Material” 
as Original Material, Progeny, and Unmodified Derivatives, 
not including Modifications and/or other substances created 
by the Recipient through the use of the Material which are not 
Modifications, Progeny or Unmodified Derivatives).
34.  Id. at 12,773 (defining “Modifications” as substances 
created by the Recipient which contain or incorporate the 
Material.).
35.  Id. (“[those] substances created through the use of the 
Material or Modifications, but which are not Progeny, Unmodified 
Derivatives or Modifications (i.e. do not contain the Original 
Material, Progeny or Unmodified Derivatives”)).
a clear and equitable ownership structure surrounding 
the Material and its byproducts that is in line with pro-
research principles. 
 The first two provisions of the UBMTA 
make sense when supported by the third and fourth 
fundamental provisions: that the Material will be used 
“solely for teaching and academic research purposes,”36 
and “the Provider shall have no obligation to grant 
such a [commercial] license to the Recipient . . . .”37 
For some, these two provisions are seen to hinder 
the UBMTA because they anchor the UBMTA 
in non-commercial use and encourage university 
technology transfer officials “to depart from the 
[UBMTA] whenever they think a particular material 
may have commercial value.”38 However, my belief 
is that these provisions, and even deviation from the 
UBMTA itself in some cases, are not a bad thing. 
To borrow some language from the Supreme Court 
and the jurisprudence of copyright, which itself was 
borrowed from 18th century english literature, “[n]o 
man but a blockhead ever wrote, except for money.”39 
The utilization of this quote shows, or at the very 
least suggests, that creation is inextricably linked to 
commerce. Therefore, even if the UBMTA itself does 
not deal with the logistics of material transfers in the 
commercial world, it creates an environment ripe for 
commercial opportunities because increased research 
activities increase the propensity for commercially 
viable material, which may further streamline 
commercial material transfers as well as others. The 
PHS and NIH support this view with language in 
the Federal Register: “any organization would retain 
the option to handle specific material with unusual 
commercial or research value on a customized basis.”40 
The UBMTA is not a catchall, but as was mentioned 
earlier, the largest difficulty has been its lack of a unified 
implementation, this does not necessarily denigrate 
the potentially successful theoretical underpinning of 
the document though. The fifth fundamental principle 
of the UBMTA supports this view even further: 
the Recipient can file patent applications claiming 
inventions it made through use of the Material.41 The 
UBMTA is trying to encourage an environment where 
36.  Id. 
37.  Id. at 12,774.
38.  Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform 
and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 289, 
306 (2003).
39.  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 
(1994) (quoting 3 Boswell’s Life of Johnson 19 (1934)).
40.  UBMTA, 60 Fed Reg. at 12,771-12,772.
41.  Id. at 12,774.
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unencumbered research can lead to situations that 
promote licensing opportunities that would not have 
existed without the principles laid out in the UBMTA.
 The sixth fundamental principle of the 
UBMTA is that the Recipient will be liable for damages 
that spawn from the Material.42 This provision further 
entices institutions to share resources by letting 
Providers be free of responsibility relating to their 
Material, even though they still own the Material. 
The seventh principle is that the “[UBMTA] shall 
not be interpreted to prevent or delay publication 
of research findings resulting from the use of the 
Material or Modifications.”43 Like the second and 
third principles, the importance the UBMTA puts 
on dissemination of knowledge through publication 
further demonstrates that this document is pro-research 
and pro-creativity. The eighth and final principle of 
the UBMTA underscores the prior efforts of the NIH 
and PHS in developing this document: the Material is 
to be transferred for free, excepting any preparation or 
distribution costs.44 In essence, the UBMTA proclaims 
that the tools of research should be available for 
scientists to tinker with for the good of humanity, with 
the tacit understanding that the dissemination of these 
tools can only have positive fiscal implications flow 
from an increase in non-commercial activity.
B. The Doctrine of Experimental Use
 The development of Experimental Use by the 
courts has allowed for the unlicensed use of patented 
materials in certain situations. This section of the 
paper will explore the growth of Experimental Use as 
a doctrine and where the contours of the defense lie 
today. 
1. Development of the Defense of 
Experimental Use
 Justice Story first considered the idea of 
Experimental Use in the case of Whittemore v. 
Cutter.45 Justice Story stated that the intent of patent 
legislation was not to punish an individual who created 
a patented machine purely for her own “philosophical 
experiments.”46 Shortly after Whittemore, Justice Story 
had the opportunity to refine his first musings on 
the subject of Experimental Use in Sawin v. Guild.47 
42.  Id. 
43.  Id. 
44.  Id. 
45.  29 F. Cas. 1120 (D. Mass. 1813).
46.  Id. at 1121. See also Matthew Rimmer, Intellectual 
Property and Biotechnology 164 (2008).
47.  21 F. Cas. 554 (D. Mass. 1813).
Justice Story explained that “the making of [a] patented 
machine to be an offence [sic] within the purview of it, 
must be the making with intent to use for profit, and 
not for the mere purpose of philosophical experiment, 
or to ascertain the verity and exactness of the 
specification. In other words, the making must be with 
an intent to infringe the patent right and deprive the 
owner of the lawful rewards of his discovery.”48 Justice 
Story’s holding in Sawin was reiterated in the 1861 case 
of Poppenhausen v. Falke.49  
 In his book, Intellectual Property and 
Biotechnology, Matthew Rimmer likened the 
early iteration of Experimental Use to something 
used by natural philosophers such as Henry David 
Thoreau.50 Rimmer explains that Experimental Use 
left its roots in mechanical inventions and adapted for 
industries as diverse as agriculture, biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical drugs.51 In recent years, the doctrine 
of Experimental Use was narrowed by the courts, 
especially because the doctrine is yet to be codified into 
law.52
 Experimental Use was first narrowed in Roche 
Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceuticals Co., Inc.53 In 
Roche, a pharmaceutical drug patent owned by Roche 
Products was about to expire and Bolar Pharmaceutical, 
in preparing its application for a generic version of 
Roche’s drug to the United States Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), used Roche’s still patented 
drug in testing.54 The Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit found that Experimental Use did not 
apply in this context and that Bolar was liable for 
infringement.55 The United States Congress responded 
to Roche by enacting the Drug Price Competition 
and Patent Term Restoration Act (the Hatch-Waxman 
Act) which created an exception in section 271(e)(1) 
of the Patent Act.56 The exception granted that “it shall 
not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to 
sell, or sell within the United States or import into the 
United States a patented invention . . . solely for uses 
48.  Id. at 555.
49.  Poppenhausan v. Falke, 19 F. Cas. 1048, 1049 
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (“It has been held, and no doubt is now 
well settled, that an experiment with a patented article for the sole 
purpose of gratifying a philosophical taste, or curiosity, or for mere 
amusement, is not an infringement of the rights of the patentee.”).
50.  Rimmer, supra note 46, at 164.
51.  Id. at 165.
52.  Id.
53.  733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
54.  Id.
55.  Id.
56.  Rimmer, supra note 46, at 174.
12 Spring 2012
reasonably related to the development and submission 
of information under a Federal law which regulates 
the manufacture, use or sale of drugs or veterinary 
biological products.”57  
 Experimental Use was recently narrowed 
by the Federal Circuit decision in Madey v. Duke 
University.58 In Madey, Duke used lasers that were 
patented by a scientist, Madey, who used to be on staff 
at the University.59 After Madey’s departure, Duke 
continued to use the patented lasers, so Madey brought 
suit against the University for patent infringement.60 
The Federal Circuit found in favor of Madey and 
determined that the non-profit status of an institution 
is of no concern in an Experimental Use analysis. 
The correct focus is on “whether or not the use was 
solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for 
strictly philosophical inquiry.”61 The Supreme Court 
did not grant Duke’s petition for certiorari, and Duke 
eventually settled with Madey, however, after Madey, 
the status of Experimental Use for research universities 
is now quite unclear.62 The Supreme Court in Merck 
KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., most recently 
upheld the exception in 271(e)(1) of the Patent Act.63       
II. The Transfer of Copyrighted Music Material 
for Use in Derivative and Appropriation 
Based Works
 The Music Industry deals with the transfer 
and use of its copyrighted material in a very different 
way than the Biotech community treats its patented 
materials. Before we analyze whether the two 
institutions have any reason to approach their materials 
similarly, especially considering that copyright and 
patent encompass two different legal disciplines, we 
must examine where copyright licensing falls short 
in its treatment of contemporary works that rely on 
copyrighted source material for its chosen means of 
expression. Examples abound of musical works that 
utilize digital samples. The premiere genre of music to 
57.  35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
58.  307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
59.  Id.
60.  Id.
61.  Id. at 1363.
62.  Rimmer, supra note 46, at 164. 
63.  545 U.S. 193 (2005) (stating a four part holding by 
Justice Scalia: (1) the 271(e)(1) exception should be read broadly; 
(2) the exception is not limited to only preclinical data pertaining 
to safety of drug in humans; (3) the exception can extend to 
experimentation on drugs that do not ultimately appear in an 
application before the FDA; and (4) the exception can extend to the 
use of patented compounds in experiments that do not culminate 
with submission to the FDA).
integrate sampling into our social fabric has been hip-
hop. Artists such as Vanilla Ice, Public Enemy, 2 Live 
Crew, the Beastie Boys, and Biz Markie helped develop 
the genre both musically, and litigiously, by their use 
of digital samples.64 However, hip-hop is not the only, 
nor even the first, musical genre to utilize samples.65 
This section mimics the structure of Section I above 
and contains a study of traditional music licensing, 
desperately in want of a model agreement like the 
UBMTA, and the Doctrine of Fair Use, copyright’s 
answer to Experimental Use.
A. Traditional Music Licensing and Digital Samples
 A digital sample of music consists of a 
sound, or group of sounds, recorded on a digital 
medium66 that can be easily copied, manipulated, and 
repurposed to create new musical objects.67 In a digital 
sample of music, there are two relevant copyrights: 
(1) the underlying musical composition and (2) the 
performance of that musical composition which resides 
on the sound recording; in licensing a digital sample, 
each copyright is usually handled by a separate licensing 
agreement.68 Under the Copyright Act of 1976, it is 
64.   See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 569; Newton v. Diamond, 
349 F.3d 591, 593-94 (9th Cir. 2003); Grand Upright v. Warner, 
780 F.Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). The aforementioned artists 
used samples which contained the copyrighted materials of others, 
but from those samples crafted extremely creative, and lucrative, 
popular music.  
65.  Sampling also has a rich tradition in academia and 
high art. From Musique Concrète, developed in France in the 
early 1900s, to works by John Cage and Steve Reich, made in the 
United States during the latter part of the 20th Century, we now 
have a wide swath of artists, such as Negativland, the Books, the 
Avalanches, Four Tet, Girl Talk, Jason Urick and Cex, who blur the 
lines between hip-hop, art music, formal graduate level dissertations 
and beyond. Currently, the type of individuals who create sample 
based music range from amateurs posting exclusively on the internet 
to professional recording artists and everywhere in between.
66.  See Greg Milner, Perfecting Sound Forever 192-195 
(2009). Digital recording devices translate recorded sound waves 
into binary code (0s and 1s), to be reassembled later by a digital 
playback machine, as opposed to analog recordings that transcribe 
the actual recorded sound waves onto what is usually magnetic tape 
or wax. 
67.  See Peter DiCola & Kembrew McLeod, Creative 
License: The Law and Culture of Digital Sampling 37-42 
(2011). Sampling had taken place before digital technology; 
however, the current deluge of works utilizing samples was of no 
moment before because creating, using or reproducing samples in 
the analog world involved expensive equipment and expertise. Now, 
almost every commercially sold computer comes with software 
that allows you to easily, and intuitively, manipulate digital music 
files. Further, in the analog world, the distribution of music was 
also cumbersome and expensive, leading to even fewer individuals 
distributing their sample based works than those actually creating 
them.
68.  Melville Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 30.03 
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the exclusive right of the copyright owner to create 
derivative works; a license is necessary if an individual 
wants to create a derivative work by using a digital 
sample of a copyrighted music sound recording.69 
Copyright licensing agreements, which operate as 
contracts, allow for an infinite number of variations 
to fit the needs of the individual transaction; however, 
copyright law does necessitate that certain provisions be 
explicit and in writing to be enforceable.70 This section 
will explore copyright licensing agreements in the 
abstract before exploring how these agreements operate 
in reality. 
1. Copyright Licensing Agreements
 In his treatise on licensing, Robert Milgrim 
included a sample copyright license agreement, the 
grant of which is worth inspection.71 In Milgrim’s 
sample license, the licensor grants the licensee a non-
exclusive right to copy, prepare derivative works, 
and distribute the licensed work in a specified 
geographic region for a royalty based on the net sales 
of the licensed work.72 In one of only two footnotes 
accompanying the sample license, Milgram says, “[T]
he need to prepare derivative works is important 
for certain types of copyright license, particularly 
those pertinent to the subject matter of this treatise. 
This right permits the licensee to use the licensed 
work as a ‘base’ from which, with modifications, 
(stating the underlying musical composition is the arrangement of 
musical notes that underlie the musical piece). Originally, musical 
compositions were fixed in sheet music, or player piano rolls, and 
protection extended to the reproduction of the arrangement of 
musical notes as well as their public performance. In 1971, sound 
recordings were deemed copyrightable. The sound recording holds a 
copyright on the arrangement of said notes residing on a particular 
phonorecord. The sound recording can now also be used to fix the 
musical composition. Therefore, in a digital sample both copyrights 
are implicated because an exact copy of the phonorecord is digitally 
created when an individual appropriates a chunk of another 
individual’s song via the splicing of binary code, and that digital 
copy contains the musical composition which has been fixed by the 
sound recording.
69.  17 U.S.C. § 106 (informing that other rights are also 
implicated with digital samples, such as the performance right 
or distribution right, but those other rights would probably be 
involved in the negotiation of the right to make derivative works).
70.  Van Lindberg, Intellectual Property and Open 
Source: A Practical Guide to Protecting Code 150 (2008).
71.  Milgrim on Licensing 4-IV FORM IVC (listing 
standard terms referring to: the negation of rights not licensed, 
duration of the license, audit rights, licensor’s warranties, no grants 
of other rights, indemnification, assignment, breach and governing 
law. As we will see below, the importance of our discussion on 
traditional copyright licenses is not necessarily the wording of the 
agreements themselves but how those agreements are obtained and 
the consideration that usually accompanies those agreements.)
72.  Id.
to create a derivative work.”73 Although, Milgrim 
specifically mentions software, not music, in reference 
to the importance of derivative works creation in the 
footnote,74 it is the omission of derivative musical 
works, specifically made from digital samples, which 
perpetuates the absence of a proper licensing scheme 
for the discipline.
 In Nimmer’s seminal treatise on copyright, 
we find an omission similar to that of Milgrim.75 
While Nimmer includes sample agreements that 
handle the original sale of copyrights in musical 
compositions and sound recordings at their creation 
and sample agreements that handle musical licenses 
for motion picture, television, and stage shows 
there is no advice on how to wade the treacherous 
licensing waters in regards to digital sampling.76 Even 
more telling are the provisions of Nimmer where 
digital sampling is mentioned. In a footnote from 
the chapter on “Assignments, Licenses, and Other 
Transfers of Rights,” Nimmer briefly mentions digital 
sampling to demonstrate that past grants of copyright, 
which include the contractual language “all rights of 
whatsoever nature,” implicate digital sampling.77 This 
one line of insight on previously constructed copyright 
licenses provides little guidance for future agreements, 
which have been adjusted to such a development. 
Nimmer mentions digital sampling again in a footnote 
in his chapter on “Performance,” which posits that 
compulsory licensing in “an era of . . . digital sampling” 
may be successfully adapted to other areas of music.78 
Digital sampling is most prevalent in Nimmer’s chapter 
on “Infringement;” this paper’s section on Fair Use will 
speak to that.79
2. The “How?” and “How Much?” of Digital 
Sample Licensing Agreements 
 In the abstract, licensing digital samples may 
seem like a reasonable contractual endeavor, especially 
when a musician at a major record label has a legal 
department and financial resources to clear rights 
73.  Id. at n. 1 (emphasis added) (borrowing of “modifications” 
helps to underscore the assumption of this paper, that creation, 
whether it be technical or sonic, happens through the use of 
previously created materials and our licensing agreements should 
encourage such creation.)
74.  Id.
75.  Nimmer, supra note 68, § 30.03.
76.  Id. at §§ 30.02-30.06.
77.  Id. at § 10.10 n. 1; see also Batiste v. Island Records Inc., 
179 F.3d 217, 223 (5th Cir. 1999).
78.  Nimmer, supra note 68, § 8.17 n. 6; see also 17 U.S.C § 
116.
79.   Nimmer, supra note 68, § 13.03.
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for digital samples. Without the benefits of a major 
record label, the logistical and financial requirements 
of obtaining a license may prove insurmountable. 
First, in order to obtain a license, you have to know 
who owns the copyrighted material. There are no 
longer formal requirements for obtaining copyright 
protection and, thus, while it may still be possible to 
locate the owners of very well-known copyrighted 
works from the twentieth century our current databases 
are insufficient when it comes to works outside of that 
scope.80 This is especially true for lesser known works 
which may be more amenable to offering a reasonably 
priced license.81 With so little information publically 
available, a savvy would-be licensee probably need to 
obtain counsel to conduct a search. The search for the 
copyright owners, because there may be, and usually 
are, different owners for the respective composition and 
sound recording copyrights, in the hands of an attorney 
will be expensive, especially when the piece sought for 
licensing may be an orphan work whose owners are in 
fact be impossible to find.82 
 In Free Culture, Lawrence Lessig presents 
the example of Jon Else, a documentary filmmaker 
who unsuccessfully attempted to seek permission for 
a clip from an episode of The Simpsons to appear for 
4.5 seconds in the background of his film to show 
how difficult it can be to wade through the licensing 
waters.83 Else first contacted the office of Simpsons’ 
creator Matt Groening to seek permission for use of the 
clip.84 Groening gave Else permission, but he suggested 
that Else check with the company that produces The 
Simpsons, Gracie Films.85 Else then received permission 
from Gracie Films, who subsequently asked Else to 
contact Fox, Gracie Film’s parent company.86 Fox told 
Else two things: that Groening does not own the rights 
to The Simpsons, and that it would cost $10,000 
to use the 4.5 second clip of the Simpsons in his 
80.  Brianna Dahlberg, The Orphan Works Problem: Preserving 
Access To The Cultural History of Disadvantaged Groups, 20 S. Cal. 
Rev. L. & Soc. Just. 275, 289 (2011).
81.  Id.
82.  Id. at 281 (stating that difficulties in locating copyright 
owners can be attributed to extended terms of copyright, taking 
foreign works out of the public domain, and the change in our 
policies concerning formal registration). 
83.  Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture 96 (2004) (claiming 
it can be assumed that the process of obtaining a license would be 
the same whether or not you were trying to clear a video or music 
sample).
84.  Id.
85.  Id.
86.  Id.
documentary.87 $10,000 was far above the budget of a 
documentary filmmaker like Else, so he had to digitally 
replace the Simpsons clip with footage he had taken 
for a previous film.88 This example shows the licensing 
trials and tribulations of one reasonably successful 
documentary filmmaker. We will return to the progress 
in licensing forged by documentary filmmakers in our 
discussion of Fair Use, but now we will look directly at 
the startling costs that can accompany licensing digital 
samples in music.
 Jay L. Berger, agent and business manager of 
a musical group entitled “The Cold Crush Brothers,” 
submitted expert testimony on licensing in the case 
The Cold Crush Brothers v. Columbia Recording 
Corp.89 Berger explained that a typical license fee for 
a sound recording would be between $0.05 and $0.08 
per unit and for a musical composition90 would be 
from $0.03775 to $0.0755 per unit.91 These prices are 
extremely small by themselves, but Berger explained, 
“[i]n negotiating a contract for a license, customarily 
he would demand a non-refundable advance based 
on either 500,000 or 1,000,000 units, as an initial 
payment.”92 Assuming that Berger would have asked 
for an advance on 1,000,000 units, the total sound 
recording and musical composition licenses would 
cost between $87,750 and $155,500.93 The court 
found that Berger’s calculations were reasonable.94 
These “reasonable” costs are prohibitively expensive 
for amateur and even most professional creators who 
are interested in making music that utilizes digital 
samples.95 With proper licensing as an untenable 
87.  Id. To provide context, Else’s documentary was on 
Wagner’s Ring Cycle, and the fleeting shot of the Simpsons came at 
the bottom corner of the screen when Else took footage of stage 
hands on a break playing checkers and watching TV.
88.  Id. at 97.
89.  2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84729 (S.D.N.Y 2006) (stating 
that Berger “reviewed and/or negotiated more than three hundred 
songwriter contracts and master license use and sample use 
agreements for master recordings and compositions”).
90.  The license fee for a musical composition is usually 
determined by statute. See 37 C.F.R § 255.3.
91.  The Cold Crush Brothers v. Columbia Recording Corp., 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84729, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (basing 
figures on a “per-unit sold” basis).
92.  Id.
93.  Id. at *13 (holding that Berger did, in fact, ask for this 
number and it was found reasonable, but the higher number was 
chosen specifically in reference to the copyright infringement 
involved in the case; however, even if the minimum advance was 
chosen by Berger, it would not make the licensing cost any less 
prohibitively expensive for the majority of musicians). 
94.  Id.
95.  Lessig, supra note 83, at 96 (pointing out that Public 
Enemy’s manager will no longer “allow” them to sample because 
15American University Intellectual Property Brief
solution to creating works with digital samples, artists 
only viable option is to hope that their work qualifies 
under the doctrine of Fair Use.
B.  Why Fair Use Does Not Work for Creating 
Derivative Works with Digital Samples
  Codified in the Copyright Act of 1976, 
Fair Use allows for the “use of a copyrighted work, 
including such use by reproduction in copies or 
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that 
section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching . . . scholarship, or research.”96 
Fair Use is an affirmative defense that can be brought 
by an individual with an infringement claim against 
them.97 In determining whether the purported infringer 
has a successful claim of Fair Use, the court must 
consider the following four factors: (1) the purpose and 
character of the use, including whether such use is of 
a commercial nature or is for non-profit educational 
purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) 
the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) 
the effect of the use upon the potential market98 for or 
value of the copyrighted work.99 The Fair Use analysis 
is conducted by the court on a case-by-case basis, with 
each factor given more, or less, weight depending on 
the context.100 In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 
the Supreme Court stated that “the more transformative 
the new work, the less will be the significance of other 
factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a 
finding of fair use.”101 With no bright line test for Fair 
Use, it can be a highly unpredictable defense to use 
with hardly consistent results.
 We are concerned with how the courts have 
dealt with Fair Use in the context of copyrighted 
music compositions and sound recordings. To apply 
the doctrine of Fair Use it is first necessary to find 
the legal costs are too high); see Willful Infringement: A Report 
from the Front Lines of the Real Culture Wars (Fiat Lucre 
Productions 2003).
96.  17 U.S.C. § 107.
97.  Id.
98.  Campbell, 510 U.S. at 569 (1994) (holding that the 
consideration of the effect upon the potential market extends not 
only to the copyrighted work, but to derivative works as well).
99.  Id.
100.  Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 
471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985).
101.  Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579; see also Folsom v. Marsh, 
9 F. Cas. 342, 344-45 (CCD Mass. 1841) (“[I]t is as clear, that if 
he thus cites the most important parts of the work, with a view, 
not to criticise, but to supersede the use of the original work, and 
substitute the review for it, such a use will be deemed in law a 
piracy.”).
infringement. Usually, Fair Use has been relegated 
to the realm of parody and news reporting, however, 
music made with digital samples more naturally 
falls under the headings of critique or comment.102 
Therefore, because the case law is undeveloped in 
the arena of Fair Use and digital samples, it will be 
necessary to focus our study on the concept of de 
minimis use, which has played a more substantial part 
in showing musicians and lawyers how and when they 
may use digital samples.
1. De Minimis and Fair Use
 In Newton v. Diamond, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit analyzed 
whether a six second, three note digital sample 
infringed the composition copyright of a piece of 
music.103 In analyzing the sample, the court applied 
the theory of de minimis copying, which allows for 
some copying as long as an average listener would 
not recognize the use of the original composition.104 
The court conducted its analysis under the framework 
laid out by Justice Story in Folsom v. Marsh, just 
as the Supreme Court did in Campbell.105 The 
court concluded that the use of the sample was not 
of any quantitative or qualitative significance and 
was therefore de minimis.106 Newton allows for the 
possibility that a composition copyright in a digital 
sample can be used without obtaining a license; the 
same cannot be said for the sound recording copyright 
though.
 In Bridgeport v. Dimension Films, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
examined whether another use of a three note digital 
sample was considered de minimis, however, this 
time the examination implicated the sound recording 
copyright.107 The court fashioned a bright line 
rule unlike any that has been seen in the Fair Use/
de minimis jurisprudence: “Get a license or do not 
sample.”108 The court, after delivering its ruling, stated 
102.  See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579; see also Harper 471 U.S. 
at 560.
103.  Newton v. Diamond, 349 F.3d 591, 594 (9th Cir. 
2003) (the defendants in this case had properly licensed the sound 
recording copyright for use in their derivative work; therefore, the 
Court’s analysis only concerned the composition copyright).
104.  Id. See also Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 434 (9th Cir. 
1986).
105.  Newton, 349 F.3d at 596-97.
106.  Id. at 598.
107.  410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).
108.  Id. at 801 (being somewhat similar to Judge Duffy’s 
opening remark of Grant Upright v. Warner, 780 F. Supp. 182 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“Thou shalt not steal.”)).
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that it did not see this test as one that would stifle 
creativity because a musician could mimic the sound 
of the recording by playing the instruments himself 
or, if he felt so inclined to sample, the market would 
keep the price of samples reasonable.109 In perhaps 
even less justified musings, the court explained that 
many musicians and record labels have chosen to 
license, implying that this has become a reasonable 
practice for all.110 Of course, the court found that 
summary judgment in favor of Dimension Films was 
inappropriate and remanded the case to the district 
court.111  However, the court did say that on remand 
the district court was free to hear arguments on Fair 
Use.112 It is substantially dubious that the district 
court could have been able to find Fair Use after the 
“get a license or do not sample” maxim. Fair Use is 
wildly unpredictable; therefore, the music and legal 
communities are left only to wonder whether they 
should test the bounds of the Sixth Circuit’s axiom or 
just obtain an expensive license.  
III. The Music Industry through the Creative 
Lens of the Biotech Community
  The music industry could benefit from the 
implementation of systemic changes which mimic 
the Biotech community’s support for research and 
experimentation. The first part of this section will 
explore the first major roadblock presented by this 
proposal: why should the creation of music with digital 
samples be sublimated to a similar plane as scientific 
research done at the university level? Second, this 
section will examine how the music industry could 
create a model agreement such as the UBMTA to easily 
license digital samples. 
A. Why is an Easy and Equitable Licensing Scheme 
for Digital Samples Important, or at Least 
Worthy of UBMTA like Treatment?
 Apart from being born out of Article I, § 8, 
Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, copyright 
and patent do not share many practical similarities. 
However, that one common thread should not be 
overlooked and can be used to buttress this argument: 
our founding fathers were interested in the progress of 
both the arts and sciences, even if, semantically, those 
109.  Id. (demonstrating that as seen in the discussion of The 
Cold Crush Brothers, the cost of licenses for digital samples is not 
reasonable).
110.  Id. at 804.
111.  Id. at 805.
112.  Id.  
two terms played different roles at the drafting of the 
Constitution. Art and science are not analogous in the 
micro sense, but from the macro perspective of creative 
based endeavors in western civilization, similarities are 
apparent. The comparisons become even clearer when a 
public/private duality underlies the information used in 
both creative fields. Sound and Biotech, as egalitarian 
members of the IP brotherhood and disciplines that 
both bear most of their fruit from new things made 
out of old things, equally deserve to have their progress 
promoted as Article I, § 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution 
intended. 
1. How Incompatible is Western 
Civilization’s Creative Process with 
Current Licensing Schemes?
 Two examples, one antiquated and one 
contemporary, best illustrate some misconceptions 
of the average IP lawyer, or citizen for that matter, 
about how music creation actually occurs. In his book, 
Music and Copyright, Ronald Rosen presented the 
story of Antonio Lucio Vivaldi and Johann Sebastian 
Bach, two titans of western classical music.113 In 1712, 
Vivaldi composed a Concerto for Four Violins; in 1730, 
Bach composed a Concerto for Four Harpsichords.114 
Other than being arranged for different instruments 
and being in different keys, the pieces are exactly the 
same.115 Rosen postulated that Vivaldi would have 
never brought suit against Bach, even though he had 
an open and shut case of infringement, for two reasons: 
“(1) there was no concept of copyright protection in 
Germany and Italy (the obvious venues for legal action) 
nor were there any copyright laws in those “countries” 
in the 18th century; and (2) until the late eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries in Italy and Germany, the 
concept that anyone could “own” literary, musical or 
other artistic creations was not contemplated.”116 So, 
the first reason that licensing would be incompatible 
with the tradition of Western music creation is that the 
musicians themselves, until somewhat recently, would 
113.  Ronald Rosen, Music and Copyright 4 (2008).
114.  Id.
115.  Id.; see Norman Carrell, Bach the Borrower 241 
(1967). This was not an isolated case; Bach liberally borrowed from 
a host of other composers such as Corelli, Albinoni, Benedetto 
Marcello, Torelli, Telemann, Neumark, Rosenmüeller, Buxtehude 
and others. And Bach was not the only person to participate in this 
common practice. George Frideric Handel shared Bach’s proclivity 
for borrowing and building on the music of his contemporaries.
116.  Rosen, supra note 113, at 5 (“[T]his is most certainly 
the tradition that we descended from musically, as well as legally, 
because, remember, our first copyright statute of 1790 granted only 
protection to books, maps and charts, not music.”).
17American University Intellectual Property Brief
have thought the proposition itself absurd. However, 
in our next example we find out what happens when 
the buck stops being passed and a musician from the 
“borrowing” heritage accepts payment for a license of 
his musical composition.  
 James Boyle, in his book The Public Domain, 
followed Ray Charles’ song “I Got A Woman” forward 
and backwards in an attempt to discover what source 
materials went into making the song and how the 
song was later allowed to be used.117 Boyle asserted 
that it was musicologically common knowledge that 
Charles’ song was merely a rewording of the hymn 
“Jesus Is All the World to Me,” which was written by 
Will Lamartine Thompson and published in 1904.118 
Under the copyright law of the time, when Ray 
Charles released “I Got A Woman” in 1955, his use of 
Thompson’s material would have been justified without 
a license because “Jesus Is All the World to Me” would 
have been in the public domain.119 Boyle was skeptical 
of Thompson’s song actually being the source material 
for “I Got A Woman,” because he said there was little 
resemblance between the two pieces.120 After tedious 
research, Boyle found what he called a “mysterious 
song” by the Bailey Gospel Singers entitled “I’ve Got 
a Savior,”121 which sounds like “I’ve Got A Woman” 
and predates Ray Charles.122 After even more digging, 
Boyle found that “I’ve Got a Savior” had roots in 
the spiritual “Ain’t That Good News,” from 1940.123 
Charles was known for creating re-worded versions of 
gospel songs and turning them into rhythm and blues, 
so the probability of this progression with “I Got A 
Woman” was likely.124 It was probable that “I’ve Got a 
Savior” did not properly obtain copyright protection 
when it was written, so no matter which song was 
Charles’ source material, their respective inhabitance 
in the public domain would have allowed him to make 
his adaptation of the work.125  Boyle’s main concern 
was this: Thompson and Ward were likely to find 
Charles’ new work, a mesh of sacred and secular music, 
to be unsavory at best.126 Under today’s copyright law, 
117.  Boyle, supra note 2, at 126.
118.  Id. at 127-28.
119.  Id. at 128.
120.  Id. at 127-28.
121.  Id. at 134 (stating that “I’ve Got a Savior” was thought 
to be written by famous gospel singer Clara Ward).
122.  Id. at 133. 
123.  Boyle, supra note 2, at 133.
124.  Id. at 134. Charles had turned Clara Ward’s “This Little 
Light of Mine” into “This Little Girl of Mine.”
125.  Id. at 136.
126.  Id. at 134.
Charles would have had to obtain a license from either 
Thompson or Ward to create his seminal work, and it 
would have been at their discretion to refuse Charles 
such a license.127 With this intense background for 
Ray Charles as “borrower sans-license,” we skip to the 
present, where rapper Kanye West released his song 
“Gold Digger.”128 
 West’s song sampled the music composition 
copyright of “I Got A Woman,” and West obtained 
a license through Charles’ estate, a license the heirs 
to Charles’ estate were not required to give.129 Boyle 
conducted a Fair Use/de minimis analysis, like the 
one illustrated above, to contemplate whether West 
needlessly obtained a license.130 Boyle’s analysis leads 
to anything but a concrete answer for whether West 
should have been able to sample without a license; 
therefore, it is safe to say that West’s decision to obtain 
a license was conscientious, at least.131 To complicate 
matters further, an amateur hip-hop group, Legendary 
K.O., digitally sampled West’s song in response to 
Hurricane Katrina and West’s thoughts on President 
George W. Bush’s actions during the conflict.132 No 
licenses were obtained by Legendary K.O.133 The full 
circle of this group of creative events is important 
because it fully illustrates how people make musical 
objects and the interactions between musical motifs, 
digital samples, and other musical elements in our 
creative culture. This situation is also fodder for the 
argument that perhaps musical creation can gain 
a level of deference held by scientific research; a 
creative dialectic of this magnitude is one of the most 
remarkable aspects of our humanity. Now that the 
tango danced between music creation and the law has 
been displayed, it is worthwhile to explore how similar 
systemic values can be found in the creative endeavors 
of the Biotech community.    
2. The Human Genome Project is Similar to 
Ray Charles
 In the example above, it was shown that 
copyright laws instituted in the latter part of the 20th 
century made it more difficult to create musical works 
that were created using similar methods earlier in 
127.  Id. at 156.
128.  Id. at 138.
129.  Boyle, supra note 2, at 140.
130.  Id. at 140-41.
131.  Id. at 142.
132.  Id. at 142-43.
133.  Id. at 157 (stating that Legendary K.O. understood 
that Kanye West probably had a legal right to claim that their song 
infringed his copyright).
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the century. In the Biotech community, the Human 
Genome Project (HGP) also contrasts the use of 
material, in this case genetic as opposed to sonic, 
in both the public and private sectors. However, in 
the example of the HGP explicated below, the battle 
between public and private use of material happens 
simultaneously instead of sequentially.
 The HGP was started in 1990 by the U.S. 
Department of Energy and the NIH with public 
funds and the goals to “identify all the approximately 
20,000-25,000 genes in the human DNA, determine 
the sequences of the 3 billion chemical base pairs 
that make up human DNA, store this information in 
databases, . . . [and] transfer related technologies to 
the private sector . . . .”134 In 1998, Celera Genomics 
(“Celera”), a research group founded by former NIH 
scientist Dr. J. Craig Venter, decided to initiate a 
similar project, but using private funds and aiming 
to patent specific genes.135 Celera’s approach also 
differed from the publicly funded project in that it 
only published its data annually, instead of daily, and 
it provided its data by way of subscription to academic 
and commercial institutions.136 On March 14, 2000, 
President Bill Clinton issued a joint statement with 
U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair which stated that “raw 
fundamental data on the human genome, including 
the human DNA sequence and its variations, should 
be made freely available to scientists everywhere.”137 In 
February of 2001, both the public and private efforts 
to map the human genome were published in Nature138 
and Science,139 respectively. Celera had incorporated 
the public data into their genome, but prohibited the 
public effort from using Celera data.140  
134.  Human Genome Project Information, http://www.
ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/home.shtml (last 
visited Jan. 11, 2011). 
135.  See Celera, https://www.celera.com/celera/history; 
see also Kristen Philipkoski, Celera Wins Genome Race, Wired 
(Apr. 6, 2000), http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/
news/2000/04/35479.
136.  See Kristen Philipkoski, Final Stretch in the Genome Race, 
Wired (Oct. 25, 1999), http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/
news/1999/10/32076. 
137.  Joint Statement by President Clinton and Prime Minister 
Tony Blair of the U.K. (Mar. 14, 2000), http://clinton4.nara.gov/
WH/EOP/OSTP/html/00314.html. This statement curbed Celera’s 
attempts to patent specific genes; however, it did not change Celera’s 
choice to offer its data via subscription.
138.  Eric S. Lander et al., Initial Sequencing and Analysis of the 
Human Genome, 409 Nature 860 (2001).
139.  J. Craig Venter et al., The Sequence of the Human 
Genome, 291 Science 1304 (2001).
140.  Lewis Hyde, Common as Air: Revolution, Art, and 
Ownership 191, 196 (2010).
 Celera’s unwillingness to share its data is 
analogous to Ray Charles borrowing freely from his 
predecessors while asking that new musicians obtain 
licenses of his work. In both cases, Ray Charles and 
Celera are able to have their cake and eat it too. 
Leslie Roberts anticipated this type of situation at the 
outset of the HGP in his article, Genome Project: 
An Experiment in Sharing, which was published in 
the same journal as Celera’s genome results.141 In the 
case of the HGP, even Celera realized the hypocrisy 
of its ways when, in 2005, they decided to end their 
subscription service and place their genome sequence 
data in the public GenBank.142 It is true that the HGP 
example does not specifically include the use of MTAs 
or the UBMTA; however, the significance is that both 
the Biotech and music communities similarly suffer 
when private entities are allowed to exploit public 
information, but not vice versa. Creation, in either 
context, functions properly when public information 
is privatized in such a totalizing way. This paper does 
not bemoan the privatization of information in total, it 
only contemplates situations where the proprietization 
of information should be handled with more nuance, 
especially in situations where similar information is 
handled both publicly and privately.  With the parallel 
solidified, or at least enumerated, between the two 
disparate communities we can now explore the ways 
in which the music community can learn from the 
Biotech world.
B. A Model Sampling License as the Musical 
UBMTA
 In a complex area of law such as intellectual 
property licensing, where many intricate transactions 
constantly take place and the industries involved 
rely on those transactions taking place quickly and 
efficiently, it makes sense for each industry to adopt 
some sort of standard practice. The NIH and PHS 
clearly recognized the need that existed to streamline 
transfers of patented materials between universities for 
research and non-commercial purposes. The process 
used to create the UBMTA can be replicated in crafting 
a model agreement for licensing digital samples.
 Just as the NIH proposed the UBMTA,143 
it would not be unfathomable for a Model Sampling 
License (MSL) to be proposed, in this case, by a 
141.  Leslie Roberts, Genome Project: An Experiment in 
Sharing, 248 Science 953 (1990).
142.  Jocelyn Kaiser, Celera to End Subscriptions and Give Data 
to Public GenBank, 308 Science 775 (2005).
143.  See Part I(A)(i), supra. 
19American University Intellectual Property Brief
national think tank responsible for monitoring these 
types of issues, such as Future of Music Coalition, 
the Electronic Frontier Foundation, or the Center for 
Social Media at American University’s Washington 
College of Law. If the necessary credence for 
such a policy proposal must come from a federal 
administrative agency, it seems most likely that the 
United States Copyright Office could provide guidance 
to Congress on such an issue. After a period of public 
comment, a document could be crafted by the original 
third party policy proposer that properly balances 
the Constitutional requirements of copyright and the 
contemporary realities of the marketplace. 
 Just as the UBMTA was insufficient for all 
transactions, the MSL would not be a one size fits 
all answer to sampling licenses. In this context, the 
concern is amplified because the number of musicians 
that exist, only counting musicians who utilize digital 
samples, dwarfs the number of university level scientific 
researchers. The MSL could be in a tiered system 
depending on different levels of use that the licensee 
is willing to abide by.144 The tiers could correlate to 
different levels of freedom associated with each license, 
similar to Creative Commons (CC) licenses which 
allow for the licensors to control the level of restriction 
for each particular license it offers.145 Major record 
labels have not adopted CC; this is likely because most 
content creators do not believe that CC engenders 
fiscally viable interactions between licensors and 
licensees.146 An MSL would change that because it 
would set up a dialogue between licensees interested 
in procuring a non-commercial license, which has 
the propensity for commercial use in the future, 
with licensors vying to enhance the value of their 
copyrighted works. In this way, the MSL would mimic 
the UBMTA. Bavarian Nordic v. Acambis Inc. is an 
144.  This could allay some fears of the record labels that are 
licensing content. One of the concerns is that there would be no 
control of uses as either commercial or non-commercial because 
of how digital music can move around the internet. However, this 
ignores the changing economic principles of the music industry as 
they apply to the internet. See Jared S. Walsh, Pay What You Like - 
No, Really: Why Copyright Law Should Make Digital Music Free For 
Non-Commercial Uses, 58 Emory L.J. 1495 (2009).
145.  See Creative Commons, www.creativecommons.
org/licenses/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2011) (Creative Commons is a 
licensing system that parallels standard copyright law. CC allows its 
users to mark their digital material with a license that explains what 
rights the license holder has allowed the public to engage in with 
their work).
146.  At least in the literary world, this is strange because 
writers like Lawrence Lessig and Cory Doctorow have been 
extremely successful giving away their books for free under CC 
licenses online.
example of a case where a licensor lost potential future 
commercial ventures with his material because he 
unwittingly transferred material using an unrestricted 
MTA.147 If the parties in Bavarian Nordic took part 
in the UBMTA, then 1) the use of the material would 
have been restricted to non-commercial, and 2) the 
stage would have been set for those non-commercial 
uses to be renegotiated into commercial uses. With 
no current model agreement available for use with 
digital samples, there is no good way for individuals 
to successfully make sure that instances like Bavarian 
Nordic do not happen to them. The MSL will borrow 
directly from the UBMTA to avoid scenarios like 
Bavarian Nordic.  
 In terms of borrowing terms directly from 
the UBMTA, there are specific provisions that it 
would benefit the MSL to appropriate. First, the MSL 
should have a similar structure related to allocation of 
ownership as the UBMTA. In the MSL, the Provider 
would be the content provider and the Material 
would be the digital sample. The Provider would 
retain ownership of the digital sample and any trace 
of the digital sample which exists in modifications, 
which were not Fair Use or de minimis, made by the 
Recipient musician. The use of the Fair Use and de 
minimis doctrines would mimic the ownership clause 
in the UBMTA where the Recipient retains ownership 
of works that no longer contain any original material, 
progeny, or unmodified derivatives.148 
 The base level MSL could include use 
provisions similar to those of the UBMTA, namely that 
the Recipient would use the digital sample solely for 
“teaching and academic research purposes.”149 Again, 
this may seem like a provision that cannot be blindly 
taken from the Biotech context and thrown into the 
den of musical wolves. However, as the lengthy study 
above showed, what is being conducted here by the 
147.  486 F. Supp. 2d 354, 364 (D. Del. 2007). It is unclear 
whether Plaintiff in the case actually had ownership of said material, 
but for purposes of this paper it can be assumed that he did.
148.  It may be difficult to draw an exact line where the 
Provider’s original sample no longer exists in the Recipient’s new 
musical work. However, it is reasonable to believe that there is a 
qualifiable level wherein the sample has been so far modified that 
it is unrecognizable from its original form. See Shamantis, Justin 
Beiber: 800% Slower, YouTube (Aug. 16, 2010), http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=QspuCt1FM9M. 
149.  Currently, there is no specific field of “Academic 
Research” sampling in music. There is sampling that happens in 
the academic context, but similar sampling also takes place in the 
amateur context. In this case, the “Academic Research” clause of the 
UBMTA would be interpreted as allowing non-commercial use with 
a properly executed MSL.
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music creators is cultural research of mass import. This 
cultural research leads to dissemination of important 
criticism and critique from the populous, something 
that should not be relegated to academic institutions in 
this case. Further, digital samples are fantastic teaching 
tools for imparting onto the younger generation the 
skills of technology. Just as individuals learned to write 
words and then paint pictures, children will learn how 
to code and manipulate digital samples. However, this 
is where the MSL could deviate from the UBMTA by 
having different tiers of use in an attempt to deal with 
the much larger magnitude of potential users of digital 
samples.   
 The MSL will also contain the provision from 
the UBMTA dealing with the commercialization of 
the digital sample or modifications of such. This clause 
is another vehicle for the MSL to encourage dialog 
between the licensor and the licensee about creating 
viable economic opportunities for both parties where 
none existed before. As the market continues to change 
from what the record labels were used to in the past 30 
years, such a boon from this sort of licensing, perhaps a 
pittance before, will look infinitely more attractive. 
 Another delicate area of transference from 
the UBMTA to the MSL will be in the publication 
provision. Most music created with digital samples, 
even if completely non-commercial, is meant for 
publication primarily, if not solely, on the internet. 
This type of “user generated content,” is one of the fires 
that burn most brightly for the population of potential 
Recipients to the MSL agreement.150 However, another 
level of the tier structure could delineate different levels 
of publication allowed for such a license.          
 Finally, it will be important that, for at least 
the base level MSL, the transfer of the digital sample 
to the Recipient is free, minus transaction costs. The 
transaction cost here could even be the price of the 
song itself, assuring that from now on individuals must 
purchase the material that they are interested in using 
to create derivative works. 
C. The Actual Hope for a MSL
 There is actual hope for this type of endeavor 
to take hold in the music industry and community. 
Arts communities have been trying to deal with the 
dearth of model agreements which could help different 
mediums create their work without legal red tape. The 
Center for Social Media (CSM) in Washington, DC 
has been spearheading efforts for what it calls “Best 
150.  See Boyle, supra note 2, at 40-41.
Practices in Fair Use.”151 The CSM first dealt with the 
medium of documentary filmmakers to deal with the 
type of problem that we encountered in section II(A)
(ii) of this paper. The process that the CSM and the 
community of documentary filmmakers went through 
to create a model agreement that both creators and 
corporations could agree on resembled the process 
needed to create the UBMTA. Obviously, as has been 
shown above, music presents its own unique problems 
for Fair Use and licensing. The attempt for a “Best 
Practices in Fair Use for Music Sampling,” again 
organized by CSM, but this time partnering with the 
Future of Music Coalition,152 would be an amazing 
collaboration which could facilitate either an MSL, or 
a “Best Practices,” that would have an equivalent effect. 
I implore both organizations to think deeply about 
pursuing such an endeavor.  
 The first definitive text on law and digital 
sampling, Creative License: The Law and Culture of 
Digital Sampling by Kembrew McLeod and Peter 
DiCola, was released March 2011.153 The book analyzes 
specific examples of seminal albums featuring digital 
samples, such as Public Enemey’s Fear of a Black 
Planet and Beastie Boys’ Paul’s Boutique, which could 
no longer be made today without some type of legal 
reform.154 The book offers suggestions for reform in 
this area, such as enhanced property rights, compulsory 
licenses, specific definitons for de minimis at Fair Use, 
and new voluntary licenses.155 The reforms proposed 
by the book vary from moderate to quite radical, such 
as the proposal that copyright holders affirmatively, 
and with accompanying payment, opt-out of the 
public’s ability to sample its work.156 However, DiCola 
and McLeod’s work did not rally the troops around 
copyright reform, in this area.157 To underscore the 
151.  See Center for Social Media, Best Practices, 
http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/fair-use/best-practices (last 
visited January 11, 2011). A “Best Practices in Fair Use” creates an 
agreement between the industry and the creators on what will be 
considered Fair Use. Therefore, for example, creators do not have 
to guess whether their appropriation of a scene from an industry 
created film will get them wrapped into litigation. The bounds of 
Fair Use are set and followed without court intervention.
152.  For more information on the Future of Music Coalition 
visit www.futureofmusic.org.
153.  DiCola & McLeod, supra, note 67.
154.  Id. at 207-57.
155.  Id. at 217.
156.  Id. at 263.
157.  During Future of Music Coalition’s 2010 Policy Summit, 
the Center for Social Media handed out fliers for “Best Practices in 
Fair Use for Music Sampling.” No information was ever put online 
for the project, and, a year and a half later, the project has not come 
to fruition. Even after the publication of Creative License, a formal 
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academic nature of the book, the proposal mentioned 
above was offered as a “thought experiment,” not 
necessarily something with practical application.158 
This is not to denigrate the great accomplishments of 
Creative License; however, the MSL can pick up where 
the text leaves off. 
 Decisively, a sea change has already started 
to occur, and the more opportunities there are for 
equitable and profitable licensing available for creators 
and corporations to choose from, the smoother, and 
hopefully more pro-creativity, the transition will be.
IV.   Conclusion
 This paper compared the similarities that 
exist in the creation of patentable objects and the 
creation of copyrightable objects; more specifically, the 
similarities between the creation of Biotech materials 
and musical materials. In making that comparison, 
this paper showed that a particular licensing technique 
utilized by the Biotech community, the UBMTA, holds 
helpful tips for model agreements that could be used 
in the music industry for licensing digital samples. 
Whether the creative pursuit at issue hinges on the 
use of DNA or quarter notes, we are intrinsically, 
and constitutionally, motivated to make sure that the 
public benefits from our need to continually push the 
envelope. The current copyright licensing structure 
does not support new, valid, and important mediums 
of expression which will suffer, and perhaps even die, if 
new means of legally transferring intellectual property 
are not vigorously pursued. 
attempt to reform laws around digital sampling, either by legislation 
or industry practice, has not been put forward. 
158.  DiCola & McLeod, supra note 67.
